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Campaigning and Advertising: An Evaluation of the
Components of Constituency Activism at Recent British
General Elections
R. J . JOHNSTON A N D C. J . PATTIE*
It is becoming increasingly accepted among analysts of British voting behaviour that,
contrary to the conventional wisdom, local campaigning matters. The widespread view,
largely propagated by David Butler and his co-workers on the Nuffield election studies,
has been that campaigning in the constituencies by party activists and their candidates
has no influence on the outcome: the distribution of votes across the parties in each
constituency is a function of the national campaign only.1 This view was initially
challenged by studies of canvassing in the 1970s, and extended during the 1980s by
studies of campaign spending in the constituencies; further support was provided by
work in the late 1980s and early 1990s on party canvassing activity. This note takes the
challenge forward with an analysis of the impact of different aspects of constituency
campaigning.
The initial challenges to the conventional wisdom were based on experiments with
the impact of canvassing on election results,2 and followed by analyses of the reported
expenditure by parties on the campaigns in each constituency.3 The amount that can be
* Department of Geography, University of Bristol and Department of Geography, University of Sheffield. We
are extremely grateful to Profs. Seyd and Whiteley and to Prof. Denver and Dr Hands for generously providing
us with copies of their datasets, for allowing us to use them in our work, and for comments on a draft of this Note.
1 See, for example, D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1983 (London: Macmillan,
1984). This view has been slightly adjusted recently – see D. Kavanagh, Modern Election Campaigning (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1995) – but nevertheless remains the ‘conventional wisdom’.
2 See J. M. Bochel and D. Denver, ‘Canvassing, Turnout and Party Support: An Experiment’, British Journal
of Political Science, 2 (1972), 239–44.
3 The first study was by A. H. Taylor, ‘The Effect of Party Organization: Correlation Between Campaign
Expenditure and Voting in the 1970 Election’, Political Studies, 20 (1972), 329–31. Denver and Hands analysed
the impact of campaign expenditure on turnout – D. Denver and G. Hands, ‘Marginality and Turnout in British
General Elections’, British Journal of Political Science, 4 (1974), 17–35, and ‘Marginality and Turnout in General
Elections in the 1970s’, British Journal of Political Science, 15 (1985), 281–8 – but the first detailed analyses of
spending and its impact on party fortunes were reported by R. J. Johnston: ‘The Electoral Geography of an Election
Campaign: Scotland in October 1974’, Scottish Geographical Magazine, 93 (1977), 98–108; ‘Campaign
Expenditure and the Efficacy of Advertising at the 1974 General Elections in England’, Political Studies, 27 (1979),
114–19; and ‘Campaign Spending and Votes: A Reconsideration’, Public Choice, 33 (1979), 97–106. For a full
review of that literature, see R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, ‘Where’s the Difference? Decomposing the Impact
of Local Election Campaigns in Great Britain’, Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 165–74.
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spent is limited by law,4 and although many party organizations probably manage their
expenditure so that more is spent than reported, nevertheless the pattern of reported
spending is consistent with expectations derived from rational choice theory. According
to this, parties should spend more (a) defending the seats that they already hold,
especially those which they hold by relatively small majorities, and (b) challenging in
seats where they have a chance of winning. Those hypotheses are sustained by analyses
of spending patterns over more than fifty years.5
Given that parties raise and spend more money where it is most likely to have an
impact,6 the subsequent expectation is that the more that a party spends on mobilizing
voters in a constituency, the more votes it should win there. This hypothesis has also
been upheld in all analyses: in particular, the more that challengers spend, the better their
performance, ceteris paribus.7
Most reported constituency campaign spending (more than 80 per cent) is on
advertising of various forms, specifically on printing leaflets and posters designed to
bring the party and its candidate to the voters’ attention. (We use the term ‘advertising’
to refer to all expenditure.) This may stimulate a direct link between spending
on advertising and voting: the greater a candidate’s exposure to the electorate the
greater the number of votes garnered.8 Alternatively, advertising per se may not be
particularly efficacious, but the amount spent on it in a constituency provides a good
indicator of the amount of canvassing and related activity undertaken by a party there.
The more that it raises locally (most constituency parties in Britain get little, if any,
financial assistance from their central organization), then the better organized the local
party is likely to be, and the greater the number of activists it can mobilize to undertake
canvasses of voters and other activities designed to enhance turnout in support of their
candidate.
The later work on local campaigns supports the latter argument. In their study of local
Labour parties at the 1987 general election, for example, Seyd and Whiteley developed
an index of local activism in 479 constituencies based on three measures of party member
activity – displaying posters, delivering leaflets and canvassing voters.9 These data were
used to explore the relationships between activism and spending: analyses showed that
constituencies with high levels of activism, and where, in addition, relatively large
percentages of voters reported having been canvassed by Labour, tended also to be those
where relatively high levels of spending were reported.10
A study of local campaigns at the 1992 general election produced similar findings.
Based on a survey of agents – the candidates’ campaign managers – in all three main
4 R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, ‘Great Britain: Twentieth Century Parties Operating under Nineteenth Century
Regulations’, in A. B. Gunlicks, ed., Campaign and Party Finance in North America and Western Europe,
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 123–54.
5 R. J. Johnston, Money and Votes: Constituency Campaign Spending and Election Results (London: Croom
Helm, 1987).
6 See C. J. Pattie and R. J. Johnston, ‘Paying Their Way: Local Associations, the Constituency Quota Scheme,
and Conservative Party Finance’, Political Studies, 44 (1996), 921–35.
7 See Johnston and Pattie, ‘Great Britain’,
8 R. J. Johnston, ‘Political Advertising and the Geography of Voting in England at the 1983 General Election’,
International Journal of Advertising, 4 (1985), 1–10.
9 P. Seyd and P. Whiteley, Labour’s Grass Roots: The Politics of Party Membership (Oxford: Clarendon,
1992), esp. p. 182.
10 C. J. Pattie, P. Whiteley, R. J. Johnston and P. Seyd, ‘Measuring Local Political Effects: Labour Party
Campaigning at the 1987 General Election’, Political Studies, 42 (1994), 469–79.
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parties, Denver and Hands devised an index of campaign activity covering seven topics:
pre-campaign organization; number of workers involved in campaigning; proportion of
the constituency canvassed; volume of literature distributed; use of computers; and
‘knocking-up’ and other activities on polling day designed to ensure that all identified
supporters attended the polling booth. Their index (derived from a principal components
analysis of those data) was correlated with both party membership figures and the
amounts spent by the parties on those campaigns, finding that the stronger the local
campaign the greater the amount spent.11 As a consequence of this finding, Denver and
Hands used campaign spending among other indicators to ‘fill the holes’ in their dataset
where no data had been obtained from agents, as a readily-available surrogate measure
of campaign activity;12 Whiteley and Seyd used it in a similar way in their later studies
of Conservative party local campaigns.13
The implication drawn from these studies is that data on campaign spending, on which
full information is collected and published after each election,14 form a valid,
readily-available and universal surrogate measure of constituency campaign activity at
British general elections. What remains untested, however, is whether spending itself
has any independent impact on the result or whether it is no more than a good surrogate
measure of canvassing activity. Do parties which spend more than expected on
advertising (given their other campaigning activity) reap an additional benefit from that:
does advertising pay?
T H E A P P R O A C H
To answer this question we use the reported spending data and the campaign activism
variables produced by Seyd and Whiteley and Denver and Hands respectively. As a first
step, we regressed the amount spent by a party in a constituency (expressed as a
percentage of the maximum allowed there)15 against the relevant activism variable.
From this we computed the residual level of spending (the amount actually spent less
the amount predicted): a positive residual indicates more spending than expected given
the amount of campaign activity reported by the party for that constituency, whereas a
negative residual indicates less spending than expected.16
11 D. T. Denver and G. Hands ‘Measuring the Intensity and Effectiveness of Constituency Campaigning in the
1992 General Election’, in D. Denver, P. Norris, D. Broughton and C. Rallings, eds, British Elections and Parties
Yearbook 1993 (Hemel Hempstead, Herts: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp. 229–42.
12 For example, D. Denver and G. Hands, ‘Challengers, Incumbents and the Impact of Constituency
Campaigning in Britain’, Electoral Studies, 16 (1997), 175–94. For fuller details of their method, see D. T. Denver
and G. Hands, Modern Constituency Electioneering: Local Campaigning in the 1992 General Election (London:
Frank Cass, 1997).
13 P. Whiteley and P. Seyd, ‘The Influence of Local Campaigning on the Conservative Vote in the 1992 General
Election’, British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1994 (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 92–109; P. Seyd,
P. Whiteley and J. J. Richardson, True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party Membership (Oxford: Clarendon,
1994).
14 The legal requirement is set out in the Representation of the People Act, 1989, Chapter 28, Section 6.
15 The amount which can be spent varies according to (a) whether the constituency is categorized as ‘borough’
(i.e. urban) or ‘county’ (i.e. relatively rural) and (b) the number of electors on the electoral roll (see Johnston and
Pattie, ‘Great Britain’). Parties can spend more per elector in county than in borough constituencies.
16 This approach follows a similar one, though addressing a different topic, in C. J. Pattie, E. A. Fieldhouse
and R. J. Johnston, ‘Winning the Local Vote: The Effectiveness of Constituency Campaign Spending in Great
Britain, 1983–1992’, American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 969–86; R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, ‘The
Value of Making an Extra Effort: Campaign Spending and Electoral Outcomes in Recent British General Elections
– a Decomposition Approach’, Environment and Planning A, 28 (1996), 1943–8.
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At the second step we regressed the election outcome in those constituencies (using
a dependent variable described below) against both the activism variable and the
spending residual. If the former is significantly related to the outcome, this indicates that
the general process of campaigning has an impact on the outcome in a constituency (with
spending, to the extent that it is correlated with activism measures, providing a useful
surrogate for that activity). If the spending residual is also significantly related to the
outcome, then spending has an independent impact – in addition to the impact of the
general volume of campaign activity, advertising pays.
Our dependent variables in these analyses are the ratios between the percentages of
the votes cast at the election won by two of the parties. As we have argued elsewhere,17
the main goal of constituency campaigns at British general elections is not converting
voters to a particular party’s cause (though any conversions are, of course, welcome!),
but rather on identifying a party’s likely supporters and then ensuring, as far as is
practicable, that they cast a vote.18 The goal is to maximize turnout of one’s own
supporters, and so alter the ratio between the party’s vote and that of a competitor. By
using the same ratio at the previous general election as an independent variable in the
model, the analyses focus on the amount of change generated by campaign activity (the
activism variable) and spending (the residual value), holding constant the average
system-wide swing between the two parties.
We have analysed the constituencies held by the different parties separately, in
line with our arguments developed elsewhere.19 Incumbent parties tend to spend close
to the maximum in all constituencies, with little variation; challenger parties vary much
more in the amounts spent, which should be more clearly reflected in the electoral
outcome.20
L A B O U R S P E N D I N G I N 1 9 8 7
Tables 1 and 2 give results from the analyses of Labour spending at the 1987 general
election, in those constituencies for which Seyd and Whiteley had data on campaign
activity by the Labour party. (Because they studied the Labour party only, we could not
disaggregate the spending components for other parties and so concentrate here only on
Labour campaign activity and spending.) Five of the six coefficients are statistically
significant in Conservative-held seats (Table 1) indicating that both campaign activity
in general and additional spending on advertising in particular influenced the outcome.
Thus the more active the Labour challenge in a constituency (the variable LCA), the
smaller the ratio of Conservative to Labour votes in 1987, holding constant the ratio in
1983; furthermore, if the challenger spent more than predicted (LSR), this further
reduced the ratio. Where Labour campaigned strongly against a Conservative
incumbent, and spent above average for such a constituency on advertising, it reaped
an electoral benefit.
17 R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, ‘The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency Campaigns at Recent British
General Elections’, Party Politics, 1 (1995), 261–74; Johnston and Pattie, ‘Where’s the Difference?’
18 Increasingly, this ‘grass-roots activity’ complements other means of campaigning and canvassing, such as
direct mailings from party headquarters.
19 Johnston and Pattie, ‘Where’s the Difference?’
20 Johnston and Pattie, ‘The Value of Making an Extra Effort’.
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T A B L E 1 The Impact of Canvassing and
Advertising on the Results in
Conservative-Held Seats, 1987
Coefficient S.E. t
C : L87 ratio
Constant 1.07 0.13 7.94
C:L83 0.66 0.02 29.79
LCA 2 0.003 0.000 2 3.72
LSR 2 0.013 0.002 2 5.89
R2 0.89
C : A87 ratio
Constant 2 0.38 0.13 2 2.91
C:A83 1.29 0.06 24.49
LCA 0.002 0.000 3.82
LSR 0.010 0.001 8.91
R2 0.61
L : A87 ratio
Constant 2 0.09 0.04 2 1.66
L:A83 1.41 0.05 26.93
LCA 0.003 0.002 1.66
LSR 0.003 0.001 2.97
R2 0.86
N 302
Key to variables: C : L83 and C:L87, ratio of Conservative to
Labour percentage of the votes cast, 1983 and 1987 respectively.
C : A83 and C : A87 and L : A83 and L : A87 are the same ratios
for Conservative : Alliance and Labour : Alliance percentages.
LCA, Labour campaign activity; LSR, residual Labour spending
from the predicted value. (The amount spent is expressed as a
percentage of the legal maximum.)
Labour advertising, though not its general canvassing activity, also influenced the
ratio of Labour to Alliance votes (the L : A ratio): the more Labour spent on advertising
(LSR), the better its performance over the Alliance, relative to the outcome in 1983.
Finally, the greater the amount of Labour activism and the more it spent on advertising,
the better the Conservative performance relative to that of the Alliance (i.e. the C : A
ratio). The implication is that the more that Labour campaigned in a Tory-held seat, the
greater the shift from the Alliance to the Conservatives, presumably because potential
‘third-party voters’ preferred to return a Conservative MP than split the anti-Labour vote
with the possibility of the Tories losing the seat to Labour.21
The results for Labour-held seats are less impressive, which is entirely consistent with
our other work on the impact of spending: challengers benefit much more than
incumbents (Table 2). Nevertheless, the more active the Labour defence of its seats the
smaller the Conservative : Labour ratio in 1987 relative to 1983.
21 Campaign spending has been related to tactical voting in other analyses: see E. A. Fieldhouse, C. J. Pattie
and R. J. Johnston, ‘Tactical Voting and Party Constituency Campaigning at the 1992 General Election in
England’, British Journal of Political Science, 26 (1996), 403–18.
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T A B L E 2 The Impact of Canvassing and
Advertising on the Results in
Labour-Held Seats, 1987
Coefficient S.E. t
C : L87 ratio
Constant 2 0.02 0.03 2 0.05
C : L83 0.92 0.05 20.74
LCA 2 0.004 0.000 2 2.08
LSR 0.000 0.000 0.69
R2 0.75
L : A87 ratio
Constant 0.72 0.33 2.19
L : A83 1.20 0.11 11.20
LCA 2 0.000 0.002 2 0.32
LSR 2 0.015 0.005 2 2.79
R2 0.47
C : A87 ratio
Constant 0.45 0.14 3.27
C : A83 0.92 0.07 12.34
LCA 2 0.005 0.007 2 0.65
LSR 0.000 0.002 0.71
R2 0.49
N 158
Key to variables: C : L83 and C : L87, ratio of Conservative to
Labour percentage of the votes cast, 1983 and 1987 respectively.
C : A83 and C : A87 and L : A83 and L : A87 are the same ratios
for Conservative : Alliance and Labour : Alliance percentages.
LCA, Labour campaign activity; LSR, residual Labour spending
from the predicted value. (The amount spent is expressed as a
percentage of the legal maximum.)
S P E N D I N G I N 1 9 9 2
Whereas the Seyd–Whiteley data only allowed us to estimate Labour spending in 1987,
the Denver–Hands data refer to all parties. The number of constituencies for which they
had data on campaign activity for all three parties was relatively small, however, and
no analyses were possible for Liberal Democrat-held (i.e. Alliance in 1987)
constituencies; the relatively small Ns may account for the poorer performance of these
models compared to those reported above, especially in Labour-held seats.22
There is no evidence that the strength of the Labour campaign had any influence
on the outcome of its contests with the incumbent party in Conservative-held seats
(Table 3). Interestingly, however, in those constituencies where the Conservatives spent
more than predicted, presumably on a strong advertising campaign, this produced an
increase in the Conservative : Labour ratio, relative to the general change since 1987;
extra advertising brought rewards for the incumbents.23 Liberal Democrat activism also
22 Denver and Hands used campaign spending as a surrogate measure of campaign activity for parties in
constituencies for which they obtained no data from the candidates’ agents. These constituencies have been
excluded from the present analyses, as to include them would involve a degree of circular reasoning – spending
would be predicted by a measure derived from spending!
23 This is consistent with the findings in Johnston and Pattie, ‘The Value of Making an Extra Effort’.
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T A B L E 3 The Impact of Canvassing and
Advertising on the Results in
Conservative-Held Seats, 1992
Coefficient S.E. t
C : L92 ratio
Constant 0.13 0.21 0.59
C : L87 0.77 0.05 15.13
CCA 0.119 0.103 1.15
CSR 0.016 0.008 1.98
LCA 2 0.80 0.106 2 0.76
LSR 0.004 0.004 0.82
LDCA 0.215 0.092 2.33
LDSR 2 0.004 0.004 2 0.29
R2 0.92
C : LD92 ratio
Constant 0.49 0.32 1.52
C : LD87 1.11 0.15 7.63
CCA 2 0.165 0.104 2 1.58
CSR 0.003 0.008 0.33
LCA 0.249 0.079 3.16
LSR 0.007 0.004 1.75
LDCA 2 0.413 0.118 2 3.49
LDSR 2 0.011 0.004 2 2.46
R2 0.80
L : LD92 ratio
Constant 0.21 0.19 1.10
L : LD87 1.55 0.15 9.93
CCA 2 0.059 0.093 2 0.63
CSR 0.000 0.008 2 0.03
LCA 0.258 0.102 2.53
LSR 0.004 0.004 1.02
LDCA 2 0.263 0.096 2 2.73
LDSR 2 0.009 0.004 2 2.06
R2 0.92
N 74
Key to variables: C : L87 and C : L92, ratio of Conservative to
Labour percentage of the votes cast, 1987 and 1992 respectively.
C : LD87 and C : LD92 and L : LD87 and L : LD92 are the same
ratios for Conservative : Liberal Democrat (Alliance in 1987) and
Labour : Liberal Democrat (Alliance in 1987) percentages.
LCA, Labour campaigning activity; LSR, residual Labour
spending from the predicted value. (The amount spent is expressed
as a percentage of the legal maximum.) CCA, CSR, LDCA and
LDSR are the same values for Conservatives and Liberal
Democrats.
led to an improvement in the C : L ratio: campaigning by the third party apparently
stimulated reduced voter willingness to support Labour.24
24 We have repeated the analysis for Conservative and Labour canvassing and spending variables only, using
the 115 Conservative-held constituencies for which Denver and Hands had data for both Conservative and Labour
canvassing activity. This shows that both LSR and CSR were significantly related to C : L87, in the expected
direction. Additional expenditure by the Conservatives on advertising was able to counter the impact of Labour
canvassing.
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T A B L E 4 The Impact of Canvassing and
Advertising on the Results in
Labour-Seats, 1992
Coefficient S.E. t
C : L92 ratio
Constant 0.20 0.05 3.64
C : L87 0.69 0.07 9.48
CCA 0.053 0.025 2.14
CRS 0.002 0.000 2.64
LCA 2 0.055 0.016 2 3.36
LSR 0.000 0.001 0.41
LDCA 0.032 0.025 1.27
LDSR 0.002 0.005 0.42
R2 0.94
L : LD92 ratio
Constant 2 1.76 0.98 2 1.79
L : LD87 1.33 0.26 5.15
CCA 2 0.480 0.390 2 1.23
CSR 2 0.050 0.019 2 2.61
LCA 0.501 0.366 1.37
LSR 0.046 0.032 1.45
LDCA 2 1.969 0.572 2 3.44
LDSR 0.008 0.012 0.65
R2 0.73
C : LD92 ratio
Constant 2 0.14 0.47 2 0.30
C : LD87 0.95 0.21 4.61
CCA 0.060 0.223 0.27
CSR 2 0.014 0.009 2 1.47
LCA 0.211 0.167 1.26
LSR 0.023 0.015 1.58
LDCA 2 0.771 0.265 2 2.91
LDSR 0.001 0.006 0.20
R2 0.66
N 29
Key to variables: C : L87 and C : L92, ratio of Conservative to
Labour percentage of the votes cast, 1987 and 1992 respectively.
C : LD87 and C : LD92 and L : LD87 and L : LD92 are the same
ratios for Conservative : Liberal Democrat (Alliance in 1987) and
Labour : Liberal Democrat (Alliance in 1987) percentages.
LCA, Labour campaigning activity; LSR, residual Labour
spending from the predicted value. (The amount spent is expressed
as a percentage of the legal maximum.) CCA, CSR, LDCA and
LDSR are the same values for Conservatives and Liberal
Democrats.
With regard to the Conservative : Liberal Democrat (C : LD) ratio in Conservative-
held seats, the challenger’s campaign was clearly efficacious; both the amount of Liberal
Democrat activism and the amount which the party spent over-and-above the predicted
level are significantly, and negatively, related to the ratio. The more that the Liberal
Democrats campaigned and the more they spent on advertising, relative to the size of
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that campaign, the better their performance proportionate to the Conservatives and
compared to their performance at the previous general election. Furthermore,
Conservative activity and expenditure in response apparently could not counter this
impact; the challengers were able to promote their cause but the incumbents could not
respond. Liberal Democrat canvassing and expenditure also benefited the party in its
contests with Labour candidates in Conservative-held seats (the L : LD ratio). In
addition, however, Labour campaign activity was able to offset this, to the same extent
(the two regression coefficients have the same value of 0.026).
Turning to Labour-held seats, the first equation reported in Table 4 shows that the
greater the Conservative challenger’s campaigning activity and relative advertising
expenditure, the better its performance in contests with Labour incumbents, although
in this case it was significantly countered by incumbent activism (given the relative size
of the coefficients, 2 0.053 and 2 0.055 respectively, additional Labour spending more
than compensated for a similar volume of additional Conservative spending).25
Similarly in the other two equations, the more active the Liberal Democrats were in the
local campaign the more votes they were able to gain relative to each of the other parties,
with neither apparently able to respond.
In general, these findings provide less support for the overall hypotheses being tested
regarding campaign activity in general and expenditure on advertising in particular than
do those in the previous section. This may reflect on differences in the dates of the
elections studied, in the relative efficacy of the two indices of activism,26 and the number
of constituencies in the analyses. Further research is clearly needed to extend the
growing body of evidence that local campaign activity, of a variety of types, has a crucial
impact on election outcomes.
S U M M A R Y
Constituency campaigning matters. An increasing volume of studies shows that the more
activists a party has on the streets and doorsteps at a general election in the United
Kingdom, the better its electoral performance, ceteris paribus, and also that the more
a party spends on advertising, the better its performance. In this brief note we have
extended that conclusion by separating out two components of the search for votes in
constituencies: general campaigning and advertising. We have shown that, in general
and in line with other research, incumbent-party campaigning is less effective than that
by challenger parties. We have also shown that in some cases, money spent on
advertising in addition to that predicted from a party’s general level of activism in a
constituency has been effective. Advertising a party’s candidate pays.
25 A similar analysis of C : L92 to that reported in the previous footnote for the forty-five Labour-held
constituencies for which Denver and Hands had activism data for both Conservative and Labour parties also
produced significant coefficients for LSR and CSR, in the expected directions.
26 Denver and Hands’s index is based on a larger number of measures, for example, which together may account
for more of the variation in expenditure levels than does Seyd and Whiteley’s index.
